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Distributive Justice Beliefs and Group Idea Generation: 
Does a Belief in Equity Facilitate Productivity? 
Abstract 
The equity rule is favored by groups that emphasize productivity, but there is limited support for 
the notion that equity actually facilitates productivity in groups (Deutsch, 1985). We propose 
that the relationship between equity and productivity may depend on whether individual group 
members have an independent or interdependent self-construal. This prediction was tested in an 
experiment in which groups endorsed either an equity rule or an equality rule for distributing 
resources and then generated ideas as a group. The results showed that equity facilitated 
productivity (e.g., the number of ideas generated) but only in groups whose members had been 
primed with an independent self-construal. The results of both self-report and video-tape data 
support competition as the mechanism that explains this productivity gain. This work 
contributes to research on both distributive justice and small group performance by specifying 
more clearly the conditions under which a belief in equity will stimulate productivity. 
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Distributive Justice Beliefs and Group Idea Generation: 
Does a Belief in Equity Facilitate Productivity? 
Distributive justice addresses the distribution of socially-valued goods and resources (Foa 
& Foa, 1974) and the perceived fairness of the outcomes that one receives (Frohlich, 2007). 
There are many rules that people may use to allocate these social goods and resources (Deutsch, 
1985), but two in particular have received a great deal of attention: The equity rule, in which 
people are rewarded in direct proportion to their individual contribution (Adams, 1963; 1965), 
and the equality rule, in which all members of the group receive the same share regardless of 
their individual contribution (Deutsch, 1975). 
Equity and equality each represent strongly held beliefs about the fairest way to distribute 
resources, but some groups may emphasize the value or legitimacy of one rule over the other 
(Mannix, Neale & Northcraft, 1995). The equity rule is consistently favored by groups that 
emphasize productivity (Leventhal, 1976; Leung & Park, 1986). However, in a series of 
experiments, Deutsch (1985) found that although participants’ expected their own productivity to 
be higher under the equity rule, their actual performance was not significantly higher relative to 
the participants who followed an equality rule. These findings suggest that the belief in the 
equity-productivity relationship may be illusory; yet another lay prediction about groups 
unsubstantiated by the data (Stroebe, Diehl & Abakoumkin, 1992). In contrast, we propose that 
the equity rule may indeed promote productivity in groups, but that in order to produce such an 
effect, there must be congruence between the allocation rule and the dominant psychological 
orientation of the individual group members. 
Equity-equality rules and productivity in idea generating groups 
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In research on distributive justice it has been theorized that equity should facilitate 
productivity by highlighting disparities among individuals’ levels of performance and thereby 
motivating group members to compete for a larger share of the reward (Deutsch, 1985; Chen & 
Church, 1993). Indeed, there is strong evidence that competition does facilitate productivity, 
particularly in brainstorming tasks, in which the goal is to generate as many ideas as possible 
(Osborn, 1957; Simonton, 1999). For instance, competition has been shown to facilitate idea 
generation in both electronic and face-to-face groups by motivating individuals to match their 
performance with a more productive member of the group (Paulus, Larey, Putman, Leggett & 
Roland, 1996; Munkes & Diehl, 2003; Dugosh & Paulus, 2005). In addition, research on social 
motives suggests that a pro-self orientation in groups (e.g. the motive to compete) leads to better 
performance on creative idea generation tasks (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; De Dreu, Nijstad & 
van Knippenberg, 2008). 
Yet, the lack of support for the equity-productivity relationship suggests that equity alone 
may not automatically lead to a competitive orientation (Deutsch, 1985). The extent to which 
equity triggers competition may depend on individual group members’ self-construal, or how 
they view themselves in relationship to others (Singelis, 1994). People with an independent self-
construal view themselves as unique and separate from the group while people with an 
interdependent self-construal view themselves as more connected to and less differentiated from 
others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). An interdependent self may not be 
as motivated by an equity rule since they do not seek opportunities to stand out but rather prefer 
to blend-in and to maintain harmony with other group members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In 
contrast, an independent self might be more motivated to compete since the equity rule allows 
them the opportunity to stand out by expressing more ideas than others (Triandis & Gelfand, 
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1998). Therefore, in a group composed of individuals with an independent self-construal, a 
salient equity rule may activate the motive to compete, and that competitive orientation should, 
in turn, facilitate the expression of ideas. 
In sum, the current research investigates how the endorsement of equity (as opposed to 
equality) influences the expression of ideas in face-to-face groups. In the experiment that 
follows, we test the hypothesis that productivity will be highest in groups (a) that collectively 
endorse the equity rule for distributing resources and (b) whose members have been primed with 
an independent self-construal. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were 216 undergraduates from a large private university in the United States 
(39% men, 61% women, mean age of 21 years) who were paid $15 in exchange for their 
participation. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant differences in predicted effects by the 
sex composition of the group. This measure was not directly related to this article, and no further 
mention of it will be made. The experiment had a 2 (self-construal: independent versus 
interdependent) x 2 (reward allocation: equity versus equality) between-groups design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to groups of three resulting in a total of 72 groups. 
Experimental procedure 
Self-construal manipulation: Upon entering the experiment, participants were told that 
they would first work as individuals on a task that was ostensibly intended to improve their task 
focus. Self-construal was manipulated by asking participants to complete a pronoun circling task 
(e.g. “I” versus “We”) that has been shown to successfully shift self-construals in previous 
research (see Brewer & Gardner, 1996 for a detailed description). 
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Equity-equality manipulation: After the first task was completed, participants were asked 
to, as a group, read a scenario about a team that was awarded a fixed bonus for successfully 
completing a project but in the scenario some members of the team had contributed more than 
others. Each group was given 5 minutes to discuss the issue as a group and list arguments to 
support the decision to divide the bonus equally so that each member of the team received the 
same bonus (equality) or to divide the bonus unequally to give some members of the team a 
higher bonus than others (equity). 
Dependent measures 
Productivity: After the reward allocation discussion, productivity was measured using a 
group brainstorming task. Each group was given 10 minutes to generate ideas about new 
businesses that could replace an empty space left vacant by a mismanaged restaurant. Groups 
were instructed to generate as many ideas as possible. No further instructions were given. 
Productivity was measured by counting the number of non-redundant ideas generated by each 
group. 
Competitive orientation: After the experiment, participants completed a survey in which 
they were asked to imagine how they would behave in a series of eight hypothetical social 
situations that were developed to assess the extent to which people view themselves as 
competitive toward others (Triandis, Chen & Chan, 1998). After each of the eight scenarios, 
participants were presented with four options, of which one specific option corresponded to 
competition. A sample scenario is, “Suppose you had to use one word to describe yourself, 
which one would you use?: (a) competitive, (b) cooperative (c) unique, (d) dependable.” 
Participants were asked to check the one option that best reflected how they would behave in the 
situation described. All participants answered the 8 questions as instructed. We then counted 
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the number of options checked that corresponded to competition and aggregated the individual 
scores to the group level by calculating the mean for each group. A significant intra-class 
correlation demonstrated sufficient within-group agreement to justify aggregation to the group 
level, ICC = .71, p < .01 (Bliese, 2000). To ease the interpretation of our results, we divided the 
total number of competitive responses by eight to get the percentage of responses that fell into 
that category. 
Competitive behavior: We also videotaped each group’s brainstorming session and coded 
for competitive behavior during the interaction. More specifically, a single coder counted the 
number of times one individual interrupted another individual while he/she was expressing an 
idea, assuming that competitive individuals would show less regard for the ideas suggested by 
other group members (and tend to break into another person’s turn). A second coder watched 
25% of the video tapes to establish reliability (ICC = .68, p < .01). Due to a malfunction with 
the video equipment, the brainstorming sessions of two groups could not be coded. 
Manipulation checks: A free-response task was employed as the manipulation check for 
the self-construal prime (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Participants provided self-descriptions by 
finishing the prompt “I am [blank].” Responses were then coded on a 1 to 5 Likert scale with 1 
being “completely independent” and 5 being “completely interdependent” by two coders who 
worked independently and were unaware of the study’s hypotheses. Agreement between the two 
coders was acceptable (ICC = .76, p < .01) so their scores were averaged together. A significant 
intra-class correlation demonstrated sufficient within-group agreement to justify aggregation to 
the group level, ICC = .58, p < .01 (Bliese, 2000). 
Our manipulation of equity versus equality was checked with a 4-item scale. Participants 
responded to items on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 being “strongly agree” and 5 being “strongly 
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disagree.” Two sample items are: “People who contribute more to the group should always get a 
larger share of the reward” and “Members of a group should be given equal rewards regardless 
of their contributions to the group” (reverse-scored). The scale was reliable (α = .82) and 
therefore answers to the four items were averaged together. A significant intra-class correlation 
demonstrated sufficient within-group agreement to justify aggregation to the group level, ICC 
= .71, p < .01 (Bliese, 2000). 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
A 2 (self-construal: independent versus interdependent) x 2 (reward allocation: equity 
versus equality) ANOVA on ratings of participants’ “I am” statements verified a significant main 
effect of self-construal, F (1, 68) = 4.05, p < .05, such that participants assigned to the “I” 
condition described themselves as being significantly more independent (x = 2.38; SD = .23) 
than did participants in the “We” condition (x = 2.51; SD = .29). There was no significant main 
effect of reward allocation, F< 1, ns, nor was there a significant interaction, F< 1, ns. 
A 2 (self-construal: independent versus interdependent) x 2 (reward allocation: equity 
versus equality) ANOVA on groups’ responses to the equity-equality items revealed a significant 
main effect of reward allocation, F (1, 68) = 9.06, p < .01, such that participants in the equity 
condition endorsed equity (x = 2.56; SD = .58) more strongly than did participants in the equality 
condition (x = 2.96; SD = .57). There was no significant main effect of self-construal, F < 1, ns, 
nor was there a significant interaction, F (1, 68) = 1.34, ns. 
Intra-group competition 
There was a marginally significant main effect of self-construal such that groups in the 
“I” condition reported being slightly more competitive (x = 25.71%, SD = 7.92%) than did 
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groups in the “We” condition, (x = 22.52%; SD = 8.36%), F (1, 68) = 3.17, p < .10. There was 
no significant main effect of reward allocation, F < 1, ns. There was a significant interaction, F 
(1, 68) = 9.30, p < .01, such that groups in the “I” condition reported being more competitive 
when the group endorsed equity (x = 29.41%, SD = 7.14%) than when the group endorsed 
equality (x = 22.22%; SD = 7.15%), F (1, 33) = 8.86, p < .01. Furthermore, groups who 
endorsed equity were significantly more competitive in the “I” condition (x = 29.41%; SD = 
7.14%) than in the “We” condition (x = 20.61%; SD = 7.54%), F (1, 33) = 12.85, p < 01. 
The video-tape measure of competition yielded a similar pattern. There was no 
significant main effect of self-construal, F (1, 66) = 2.70, ns, and no significant main effect of 
reward allocation, F (1, 66) = 1.04, ns. There was a significant interaction, F (1, 66) = 4.37, p 
< .05, such that groups in the “I” condition were more competitive when the group endorsed 
equity (x = 2.94, SD = 1.85) than when the group endorsed equality (x = 1.65; SD = 1.69), F (1, 
32) = 4.52, p < .05. Additionally, groups who endorsed equity were significantly more 
competitive in the “I” condition (x = 2.94; SD = 1.85) than in the “We” condition (x = 1.39; SD 
= 1.72), F (1, 32) = 6.61, p < .05. 
Group productivity 
We performed a 2 (self-construal: independent versus interdependent) x 2 (reward 
allocation: equity versus equality) between-groups ANOVA on the sheer number of ideas 
generated. There was no main effect of self-construal, F (1, 68) = 1.13, ns, and no main effect of 
equity-equality rule, F < 1, ns; however, there was a significant interaction, F (1, 68) = 4.34, p 
< .05. As predicted, groups that emphasized equity generated significantly more ideas in the “I” 
condition (x = 53.24, SD = 16.63) than in the “We” condition (x = 40.58, SD = 19.79), F (1, 34) 
= 4.26, p < .05. Also, as expected, groups in the “I” condition generated significantly more ideas 
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when they endorsed equity (x = 53.24, SD = 16.63) than when they endorsed equality (x = 41.00, 
SD = 16.53), F (1, 33) = 4.76, p < .05 (See Figure 1). Thus, groups whose members had been 
primed with the independent self-construal and endorsed the equity rule were more productive 
and reported more competitive social motives than did groups in the other three conditions. A 
mediational analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) further supported the hypothesis that competition 
(measured both as a self-reported competitive orientation and as competitive behavior) was the 
psychological mechanism explaining the productivity gain in the “I/Equity” condition relative to 
the other three conditions (See Figures 2a & 2b). 
Discussion 
There is limited support for the notion that equity will facilitate productivity in groups 
even though many believe in the veracity of this relationship (Deutsch, 1985). Our results 
suggest that the purported relationship between equity and productivity may only emerge in 
groups whose members have an independent self-construal. The results cannot be explained by 
the anticipation of being directly rewarded for suggesting new ideas since we manipulated 
groups’ beliefs about how rewards should be distributed apart from the prospect of actually 
receiving payment (Toubias, 2006). An advantage of this approach is that we separated 
distributive justice beliefs from the provision of external rewards that could raise extrinsic task 
motivation (Lepper, Greene & Nisbett, 1973) and stifle creative problem solving (e.g. Amabile, 
1979). The results suggest it may be possible to facilitate idea generation, not only by rewarding 
people directly, but also by making distributive justice beliefs salient prior to working on a group 
task. 
The results supported competition as the psychological mechanism underlying the 
productivity gain; however, there may be other important mediating variables. For instance, it is 
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possible that an interdependent self may experience less regulatory fit while discussing equity 
than equality (Higgins, 2006) which may, in turn, reduce task engagement and performance 
(Forster, Higgins & Idson, 1998). Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest that it may be 
worth re-opening the equity-productivity question. The simple prediction that equity facilitates 
productivity might be replaced with a more complex series of research questions that take into 
account the contextual factors that combine with equity to promote competition and group 
ideation. 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 12 
References 
Adams, J. S. 1963. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67: 422-436. 
Adams, J. S. 1965. Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental 
social psychology, vol. 2: 267-299. New York: Academic Press. 
Amabile, T.M. (1979). The effects of external evaluation on artistic creativity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2, 221-233. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C.K.W. (2005). Conflict’s consequences: Effects of social motives on 
Post-negotiation creative and convergent group functioning and performance. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 358-374 
Bliese, P. D. (2000). Within-group agreement, non-independence, and reliability: Implications 
for data aggregation and analyses. In K. J. Klein and S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), 
Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and 
new directions, pp. 349-381. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Brewer, M.B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self 
representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83-93. 
Chen, Y. & Church, A.H. (1993). Reward allocation preferences in groups and organizations. 
The International Journal of Conflict Management, 4, 1, 25-59. 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 13 
De Dreu, C. K. W., Nijstad, B. A., & Van knippenberg, D. (2008). Motivated information 
processing in group judgment and decision making. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 12, 22-49. 
Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality and need: What determines which value will be used as the 
basis of distributive justice. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 137-149. 
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive justice, a social psychological perspective. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Dugosh, K.L. and Paulus, P.B., (2005). Cognitive and social comparison processes in 
brainstorming. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 313-320. 
Foa, U.G. & Foa, E.B. (1974). Societal studies of the mind. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 
Forster, J., Higgins, E.T., & Idson, L.C. (1998). Approach and avoidance strength during goal 
attainment: Regulatory focus and the “goal looms larger” effect. Journal of Personality 
&Social Psychology, 75, 1115–1131. 
Frohlich, N. 2007. A very short history of distributive justice. Social Justice Research, 20: 250-
262. 
Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological 
Review,113, 439–460. 
Kuhn, M.H., & McPartland, T. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-attitudes. American 
Sociological Review, 19, 69–76. 
Lepper, M.R., Greene, D. & Nisbett, R.E. (1979). Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with 
extrinsic rewards: A test of the “over-justification” hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 28, 129-137. 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 14 
Leung, K. & Park, H. (1986). Effects of interactional goal on choice of allocation rule: A cross-
national study. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 1, 111-120. 
Leventhal, G. S. 1976. Fairness in social relationships. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. 
Carson (Eds.), Contemporary topics in social psychology: 211-240. Morristown, NJ: 
General Learning Press. 
Mannix, E.A., Neale, M.A., & Northcraft, G.B. (1995). Equity, equality, or need? The effects of 
organizational culture on the allocation of benefits and burdens. Organizational 
Behavioral and Human Decision Processes, 63, 276-286. 
Markus, H.R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253. 
Munkes, J., & Diehl, M. (2003). Matching or competition? Performance comparison processes in 
an idea generation task. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6, 305 – 320. 
Osborn, A.F. (1957). Applied Imagination. New York: Scribner. 
Paulus, P. B., Larey, T. S., Putman, V. L., Leggett, K. L., & Roland, E. J. (1996). Social 
influence process in computer brainstorming. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 18, 
3–14. 
Simonton, D. K. (1999). Creativity as blind variation and selective retention: Is the 
creative process Darwinian? Psychological Inquiry, 10, 309-328. 
Singelis, T.M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 5, 580-591. 
Stapel, D.A. & Koomen, W. (2001). I, We, and the effects of others on me: How self-construal 
level moderates social comparison effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
5, 766, 781. 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 15 
Stroebe, W., Diehl, M. & Abakoumkin, G. (1992). The illusion of group effectivity. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 5, 643-650. 
Toubias, O. (2006). Idea generation, creativity and incentives. Marketing Science, 25, 5, 411-425. 
Triandis, H.C., Chen, X.P., & Chan, D.K. (1998). Scenarios for the measurement of 
collectivism and individualism. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29, 275–289 
Triandis, H.C., & Gelfand, M.J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 118– 
128. 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 16 
Distributive justice beliefs and idea generation 17 
P = .41 it 
t = -3.52 / 
Competitive 
Orientation 
p < .01 / 
/ Without competition 
I/Equity 
Condition 
P = .31 t = 2.66 
p < .01 
With competition 
P = .19 t = 1.54 
ns 
Without condition 
P = .36 t = 3.08 
p < .01 
With condition 
P = .28 t = 2.15 
\ p < 05 
P ro d uc t ivit y 
Figure 2a 
Main and mediating effects of condition, competitive orientation 
(self-report data) and productivity. Dotted arrow indicates that 
a r e la t ions hip f e ll be low s ignif ic a nc e in t he f ull mode l ( e . g. t ha t 
there is full mediation). Z = 1.90, p < .05 
P = .32 /t 
t = 2.74 
p < .01 , 
I/Equity 
Condition 
Competitive 
Be ha vio r 
Without competition 
β = .31 t = 2.66 
p < .01 
With competition 
P = .11 t = 1.15 
ns 
Without condition 
P = .63 t = 6.64 
p < .01 
With condition 
P = .60 t = 6.04 
\ p < 01 
P ro d uc t ivit y 
Figure 2b 
Main and mediating effects of condition, competitive behavior 
(video-tape data) and productivity. Dotted arrow indicates that 
a r e la t ions hip f e ll be low s ignif ic a nc e in t he f ull mode l ( e . g. t ha t 
there is full mediation). Z = 2.50, p < .01 
